Recognition Memory: Can You Teach an Old Dogma New Tricks?  by Burwell, Rebecca D. & Furtak, Sharon C.
Neuron
PreviewsRecognition Memory:
Can You Teach an Old Dogma New Tricks?
Rebecca D. Burwell1,2,* and Sharon C. Furtak1,2
1Department of Psychology
2Department of Neuroscience
Brown University, Providence, RI 02912, USA
*Correspondence: rebecca_burwell@brown.edu
DOI 10.1016/j.neuron.2008.08.004
Familiarity and recollection are components of recognition memory. Whether these underlie two separate
processes or a single process differing only in memory strength is a matter of continued debate. In this issue
ofNeuron, Haskins et al. provide further evidence in support of a dual-process perspective, whereas Shrager
et al. provide evidence supporting a single-process viewpoint.Most of us have experienced encountering
a person whom we are certain we know,
but are unable to place—that is, until we
glimpse the nametag. At that moment, we
are suddenly flooded with details about
the person, the time we met, and our prior
mutual history. This rapid transition from
knowing to remembering is consistent
with the largely agreed-upon notion that
familiarity (knowing an item was previously
encountered) and recollection (remember-
ing details of the encounter itself) are sepa-
rate mental processes. What is less certain
is whether familiarity and recollection are
separate memory processes and, if so,
whether they are mediated by the same or
different brain structures. Despite nearly
three decades of research on recognition
memory, many of the old questions remain
unanswered, and new questions have
emerged. Is recognition memory best
explained as a single process (memory
strength) or a dual process (familiarity and
recollection)? Does familiarity play a role
in associative recognition? What are the
best measures of recognition memory pro-
cess(es)? How many and which brain
structures are involved? Two papers pub-
lished in this issue of Neuron provide new
insight into the nature of recognition mem-
ory. Haskins et al. (2008) report new evi-
dence in support of the dual-process
model and the role of the perirhinal cortex
in associative recognition. Shrager et al.
(2008) present the single-process view-
point and suggest that the perirhinal cortex
and hippocampus contribute to memory
strength in the same way.
By far the most controversial issue is
whether recognition memory is best un-derstood as a single process or a dual
process. Single-process models reigned
in the 1980s and early 1990s, but dual-
process models began to gain in favor in
the mid-1990s (Yonelinas, 2001). By the
beginning of the millennium, recognition
memory was widely viewed to consist of
recollection and familiarity; however, con-
troversies still exist over whether these
are two independent memory processes
(Brown and Aggleton, 2001; Yonelinas,
2001) or a single process reflecting a con-
tinuum of memory strength (Slotnick and
Dodson, 2005; Squire et al., 2007). Both
theories assume that recognition memory
relies on the medial temporal lobe (MTL)
memory system (Figure 1); dual-process
theories suggest functional specialization
in the MTL, whereas single-process
theories suggest a global contribution of
MTL to recognition memory. As docu-
mented in this issue of Neuron, evidence
continues to accrue on both sides of the
argument.
It is fair to say that the predominant
cognitive neuroscience view holds that
the perirhinal cortex supports familiarity
for individual items, and the hippocampus
supports recollection for arbitrary associ-
ations (Davachi, 2006). This view has
been challenged, however, by evidence
that the perirhinal cortex is involved in
learning associations between items
(reviewed in Murray and Richmond,
2001). Haskins et al. present an exciting
result from an event-related functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study
of associative recognition that promises
to reconcile discrepant findings. Based
on a theory of ‘‘unitization’’ (Graf andNeuron 5Schacter, 1989), Haskins et al. hypothe-
sized that the perirhinal cortex can sup-
port familiarity-based strategies for en-
coding associated pairs of items if
encoded as a single conjunctive item
(Diana et al., 2008). Participants were
scanned during encoding of word pairs in
two conditions; the compound word
condition was designed to promote uniti-
zation of a word pair, and the sentence
condition was designed to preserve the
individual meanings of the two words. At
test, participants were presented with
studied word pairs or rearranged pairs
composed of two words, each of which
had been studied as a part of a different
word pair. In that way, each word pre-
sented in the subsequent memory test
should be equally familiar. Participants
made recognition confidence judgments
based on whether or not the pair was in-
tact or rearranged. If participants remem-
bered specific details about the presenta-
tion, they were instructed to indicate that
they remembered the pair with a rating of
‘‘R.’’ If nothing specific was remembered,
participants rated pairs from 1 to 4 based
on increasing confidence that the pair
had been studied, from 1 indicating ‘‘sure
the pair had not been studied’’ to 4 indicat-
ing ‘‘sure the pair had been studied.’’
The associative memory strength, as
indicated by the confidence judgments,
was higher for words encoded in the com-
pound condition than in the sentence
condition. An ROC analysis showed that
the familiarity estimates were higher in
the compound condition, but that recol-
lection estimates were about the same
in both conditions. Because individual9, August 28, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 523
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equally familiar, increased fa-
miliarity of the compounds
was interpreted as a function
of unitization. Furthermore,
the perirhinal cortex was im-
plicated in this increased fa-
miliarity. Activation of the left
perirhinal cortex was greater
in the compound condition
relative to the sentence condi-
tion, and perirhinal activation
was predictive of subsequent
familiarity. Notably, these
effects were not observed in
the hippocampus, thus pro-
viding evidence for functional
specialization in the MTL.
Though personal experience may sug-
gest that familiarity and recollection are
separate cognitive processes, and sub-
stantial evidence suggests that they are
supported by separate neural substrates,
there is evidence against the dual-pro-
cess view. Shrager et al. argue that recog-
nition memory is best understood as a sin-
gle process such that memory strength is
a single continuous variable that deter-
mines the success or failure of recogni-
tion. By this view, familiarity is repre-
sented in the brain as a weak memory
signal and recollection as a strong mem-
ory signal. Accordingly, the prediction is
that all brain regions involved in recogni-
tion memory would show similar patterns
of activation in a recognition memory
paradigm. In an event-related fMRI study
of single item recognition, Shrager et al.
tested the relationship between brain
activity during encoding and subsequent
memory strength as defined by a recogni-
tion confidence judgment. During testing,
participants were presented with previ-
ously studied words interspersed with
foils (or distractors) and were asked to
rate confidence on a scale of 1 to 6 such
that 1 = ‘‘definitely new,’’ 2 = ‘‘probably
new,’’ 3 = ‘‘maybe new,’’ 4 = ‘‘maybe
old,’’ 5 = ‘‘probably old,’’ and 6 = ‘‘defi-
nitely old.’’ There was a positive linear re-
lationship between confidence ratings
from 4 to 6 and brain activity during en-
coding of items in the hippocampus and
perirhinal cortex. Although the study did
not distinguish between contributions of
recollection and familiarity to recognition,
Shrager et al. interpreted this finding as
evidence that brain activity in the perirhi-
nal cortex and hippocampus during learn-
ing predicts subsequent memory strength
for recognized items regardless of
whether memory is based on familiarity
or recollection.
With regard to functional differentiation
in the MTL, Shrager et al. suggest that the
contribution of the perirhinal cortex and
hippocampus to recollection-based and
familiarity-based decisions is the same.
Because the study does not distinguish
between familiarity and recollective pro-
cesses, however, it is not possible to
rule out the interpretation that the brain
activity in the perirhinal cortex reflects
a memory process that supports familiar-
ity, and the brain activity in the hippocam-
pus reflects a memory process that sup-
ports recollection. Moreover, by this
interpretation, any regions outside the
MTL showing a different pattern of activa-
tion are not involved in recognition mem-
ory. With regard to the single- versus
dual-process debate, one might argue
that Shrager et al. provided evidence for
two processes, though possibly not both
residing in the MTL. When all levels of
confidence were included in the analysis,
activity in the perirhinal cortex and hippo-
campus across all memory strengths
tended toward a U-shaped curve such
that brain activity during encoding of
items that were rated as new showed
a negative relationship with confidence
judgments. Shrager et al. suggested that
this pattern of activity reflects a lack of at-
tention to the study item during presenta-
tion. Indeed, several brain regions outside
the MTL, thought to belong to a network
that decreases its activity during perfor-
mance of a task and termed
the default mode network (re-
viewed in Raichle and
Snyder, 2007), showed a neg-
ative linear correlation across
all confidence judgments. Ac-
cording to this explanation,
participants were not per-
forming the task during pre-
sentation of the items that
were subsequently not rec-
ognized. What the authors
do not clarify is why perirhinal
and hippocampal activity
would increase during subse-
quently not-remembered tri-
als. They suggest that the ac-
tivity in MTL structures during
trials in which study words were not re-
membered reflects attention to mental ac-
tivity unrelated to the task. The notion that
the MTL is actively involved in attention is
an interesting one that is worth further
study.
It is tempting to conclude that the evi-
dence for a dual process model of recog-
nition memory and for functional speciali-
zation in the MTL is more compelling than
the evidence for a single-process view-
point. However, a cautionary note is in
order. A primary issue in research on rec-
ognition memory addressing the single-
versus dual-process controversy has to
do with measurement. Neither paper
addressed issues about response laten-
cies. Indeed, a major strength of signal
detection approaches is its ability to ac-
count for response latencies as well as
accuracy. Given that familiarity discrimi-
nation is likely more rapid and automatic
than responses based on recollection,
the omission of a response latency analy-
sis is a shortcoming of both papers. Even
more important are the shortcomings of
the measures themselves. Though both
studies use state-of-the-art confidence
rating measures, the measures typically
used to dissociate recollection and famil-
iarity, such measures tend to be con-
founded with memory strength. To make
matters worse, stimulus sets are often
composed of arbitrary stimuli already en-
dowed with baseline levels of familiarity.
Moreover, the subsequent memory tests
likely tap memory processes that are en-
tirely different from common subjective
experiences of highly confident judg-
ments of familiarity for people and places
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What is required to settle the open ques-
tions is an experimental approach that
yields high confidence familiarity ratings
similar in strength to high confidence rec-
ollection ratings that would permit distin-
guishing separate processes. Under those
conditions, a single-process model would
predict that familiarity and recollection rat-
ings would be highly correlated and would
exhibit a positive linear relationship both
in the perirhinal cortex and hippocampus.
In contrast, a dual-process model would
predict that familiarity and recollection rat-
ings could be decoupled and that familiar-
ity ratings would be positively correlated
with activity in the perirhinal cortex and
recollection ratings would be positively
correlated with hippocampal activity. Until
these issues are addressed, a converging
view in the field is unlikely to emerge.
In this issue of Neuron, Haskins et al.
and Shrager et al. challenge accepted no-
tions about recognition memory and pro-
vide us with new insight into old ques-Consciousness M
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An important question in neuroeco
Neuron, Pessiglione et al. take an in
to make optimal choices in the abse
problem.
To the neuroeconomist, animals’ brains
evolved to be sophisticated and effec-
tive decision-making machines. This
view stems from the fact that an animal
that does not make good choices is
less likely to have fit offspring, which sig-
nificantly decreases the chances that its
genes will survive the pressures of Dar-
winian competition. From this perspec-tions. Though the two papers come to
different conclusions, they nevertheless
advance our understanding of the MTL
memory system. Whether or not the peri-
rhinal cortex and hippocampus differen-
tially support familiarity and recollection,
it is an important fact that both of these
regions interact to collectively determine
memory confidence. Likewise, it is signif-
icant that familiarity may derive from
bound associations, beyond the familiar-
ity associated with each component,
and that this function can be tied to the
perirhinal cortex. All indications are that
the next decade will produce important
advances in our understanding of the neu-
ral bases of recognition memory. With
apologies to Dorothy Parker, we must ad-
mit that it is possible to teach an old
dogma new tricks.
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